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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to suggest a coherent, credible and long-term 
counterterrorism policy in Colombia.  The events of September 11, 2001 heightened U.S. 
awareness of Colombian terrorist organizations, the most powerful being the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  The U.S. counterterror approach in 
Colombia appears fragmented, with only minor changes to its previous drug control 
policies.  In contrast, the Colombian government has developed and implemented a 
policy to combat the FARC.  To analyze the effectiveness of the Colombian 
government's efforts, this thesis takes a two-step approach.  First, it aims to clearly define 
the threat posed by the FARC, and, in doing so, expose its center of gravity.  With the 
intent of moving beyond the grievance versus greed debate, this thesis analyzes five 
characteristics of the FARC.  The conclusion drawn is that it is most accurate to 
characterize the FARC as a 'resource-based' insurgency with territory as its center of 
gravity.  Second, the thesis assesses current U.S. and Colombian policy and finds that it is 
effectively attacking the FARC's center of gravity, and these efforts must be sustained if 
the FARC is to be defeated or forced to the negotiating table. 
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Since 9/11 the war on terror has taken the forefront in U.S. foreign policy.  The 
global war on terror is primarily focused on Islamist organizations based in the Middle 
East, but there are implications for other regions that have experienced terrorism as well.  
Notably, the long-held U.S. counterdrug policy in Colombia has shifted to include 
counterterror efforts.  Two left-wing organizations in Colombia have been on the State 
Department's list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations since 1997:  the Revolutionary 
Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN).  A right-
wing organization, the United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), was added to the 
list on September 10, 2001.  While all three groups earned the label "terrorist" prior to 
9/11, Washington viewed them merely as an internal threat to Colombian security and not 
a direct threat to U.S. interests.  This viewpoint was reflected in U.S. policy, which 
prevented the use of counterdrug monies for counterterror purposes in Colombia. 
This all changed after 9/11.  The recent focus on terrorism has elevated the 
importance of the FARC, ELN, and AUC to the United States and U.S.-Colombia policy 
has shifted to incorporate terrorism.  Prior to this, the United States provided millions of 
dollars in support of Colombia's counterdrug efforts.  The policy discussed the 
Colombian guerrilla groups only from the perspective that eliminating the drug industry 
would dry up the insurgents' resource base, forcing the insurgents to disband.  In 2002, 
the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI) allowed funding for counterterrorism efforts.  
However a specific counterterrorism strategy is not developed in the policy. 
This raises the question:  given the fact that the United States has declared a 
global war on terrorism, the State Department has labeled organizations in Colombia as 
terrorists, and the United States is giving millions of dollars to Colombia in support of 
counterterrorism operations, what counterterrorism policy should Washington pursue in 
Colombia?  
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In order for the United States to wage war on terror successfully in Colombia, it 
should promote a policy that will allow the Colombian government to develop an 
effective strategy to defeat the terrorist organizations within its borders.  To develop a 
strategy, one must first understand the enemy.  In the case of Colombia, all the terrorist 
organizations are also insurgencies, that is, combat forces that field an army and fight for 
control of population and territory.  Scholars typically point to two types of insurgency, 
grievance-based and greed-based.  This literature on insurgency provides a framework to 
begin talking about the situation in Colombia but, as this thesis will show, it is 
incomplete, and, therefore, must be broadened in order to form the basis for an effective 
COIN strategy. 
Considering the recent successful negotiations with the AUC to demobilize and 
the relatively small size of the ELN, this paper will focus primarily on the FARC as the 
target of counterterror operations in Colombia.  It has been well documented that the 
FARC has turned to the illicit economy of narco-trafficking as a source of funding.  At 
first, the FARC merely taxed coca cultivation and extorted money from narco-traffickers 
in exchange for protection, but now the FARC is directly involved in production and 
sales of cocaine and heroin.  While they claim to still be motivated by ideological and 
political objectives, it is difficult to determine if these motivations remain primary.  In 
other words, is the FARC an insurgency of "grievance" or "greed," or some combination 
of both?  The answer to this question will help determine U.S. counterterror policy in 
Colombia. 
The shift in U.S. foreign policy toward Colombia, allowing the diversion of 
monies from counterdrug efforts to counterterrorism, has potentially important 
implications for both countries.  The FARC present a unique set of problems, different 
than that posed by Islamist terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.  If the United States is 
serious about counterterrorism in Colombia, it needs to develop a strategy tailored to the 
nature of that country's insurgency.  If the FARC's agenda expanded beyond the borders 
of Colombia, possibly linking with transnational terrorist organizations, they could pose a 
serious threat to the United States, and one with a substantial resource base.  Even if such  
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links are never established, the FARC present an indirect threat to the United States 
through their continued participation in narco-trafficking and undermining of regional 
stability.   
B. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature on Colombia and the FARC is extensive, as is the work on 
insurgency and counterinsurgency (COIN).  The purpose here is not to rehash that 
material but instead, to fill some gaps to aid in developing a possible counterterrorism 
policy in Colombia.  As mentioned, scholars have identified two types of motivations for 
insurgencies—grievance-based and greed-based.1  Grievance-based insurgencies are 
those that maintain ideological and political objectives.  This type of insurgency was 
most common during the Cold War in places like Malaya, Vietnam, Cuba, and El 
Salvador.  Greed-based insurgencies are those usually involved in the illicit economy, 
motivated by the pursuit of profits, and appear more like organized crime.2  A series of 
studies by the World Bank in the 1990s highlighted this relatively new post-Cold War 
phenomenon of greed-based insurgencies.3 
The academic debate regarding grievance- and greed-based insurgencies is useful 
because it recognizes that some insurgencies are motivated by more than political, 
ideological, cultural or religious differences—some insurgencies may be more interested 
                                                 
1 Cynthia J. Arnson and I. William Zartman, ed., Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection 
of Need, Creed, and Greed (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Press, 2005); Karen Ballentine and Jake 
Sherman, ed., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Reinner, 2003); Mats Berdal and David M. Malone, ed., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas 
in Civil Wars (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2000). 
2 Mark Peceny and Michael Durnan, "The FARC's Best Friend: U.S. Anti-Drug Policies and the 
Deepening of Colombia's Civil War in the 1990s," Latin American Politics and Society 48, no. 2 (Summer 
2006): 97. 
3 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," working paper (World Bank, 
1998), http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/cw-cause.htm (accessed April 15, 2007); Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War," working paper (World Bank, 
1999), http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/justice.htm (accessed April 15, 2007); Paul 
Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," working paper (World Bank, 2001), 
http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/greedandgrievance.htm (accessed April 15, 2007); Paul 
Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy," working paper (World 
Bank, 2000), http://www.worldbank.org/research/conflict/papers/civilconflict.htm (accessed April 15, 
2007). 
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in the profits they can earn through the illicit economy.  The effects of this on the 
characteristics of insurgencies and the implications for counterinsurgency, however, have 
been largely obscured by an often fruitless debate over the "true" motivations of 
insurgents—some analyze the evidence and conclude that an insurgency is grievance-
based; others, using the same evidence, conclude that it is greed-based.  Moving beyond 
this debate, this thesis argues that analysis of an insurgency's primary resource base (e.g., 
population, illegal exploitation of natural resources) often offers more insights into key 
characteristics of the insurgency (such as its relationship to the population, relationship 
with other key actors, and its organizational characteristics) than does an understanding 
of motives. 
In addition, policy prescriptions from the grievance/greed literature are arguably 
misguided.  While this debate over motivations goes round and round, the policymaker is 
left with three choices:  (1) choose a grievance-based COIN strategy, focusing on the 
population as the center of gravity (2) choose a greed-based COIN strategy, focusing on 
funding sources as the center of gravity (3) or apply a combination of both strategies.  
This paper will demonstrate that any of these choices would be wrong.  Instead, the 
framework for analysis developed in this thesis, with an emphasis on the resource base of 
the insurgency rather than its motivations, points to territory as the center of gravity for 
insurgencies that rely heavily on the exploitation of natural resources.4 
The FARC is clearly an organization that relies on the drug trade for a large 
portion of its funding.  Some vehemently argue that since becoming involved in 
narcotrafficking, the FARC has lost all of its ideological convictions and devolved into a 
greed-based insurgency.  Others argue just as ardently that the FARC is still a grievance-
based organization, and only participates in the drug trade to provide funding for the 
movement.  This debate is virtually unresolvable, and it detracts from determining an 
effective strategy to combat the FARC.  Instead of focusing on motives, this thesis 
                                                 
4 I use the term "center of gravity" to mean the enemy's true source of strength, which, if removed, will 
eliminate the enemy's will to fight.  For further amplification see, Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and 
trans., Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). 
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analyzes how the increasing involvement of the FARC in the drug trade over time has led 
to changes in key characteristics of the organization and its center of gravity. 
C. THE MAIN ARGUMENT 
This thesis makes the case for going beyond the grievance/greed dichotomy and 
focusing instead on how an insurgency’s primary resource base shapes its fundamental 
characteristics.  Understanding the characteristics of an insurgency is especially useful 
when its motivations are debatable.  A careful examination of the characteristics of an 
insurgency can help identify its center of gravity, and thus lead to the development of an 
effective COIN strategy. 
Chapter II begins with an analysis of grievance- and greed-based insurgencies, 
which are typically distinguished according to their objectives or motivations.  The 
chapter moves beyond this analysis, looking instead at the insurgency's primary resource 
base, and how that shapes its fundamental characteristics.  The five characteristics to be 
analyzed are: (1) the insurgency's relationship to the illicit economy; (2) the political 
and/or ideological goals of the insurgency (its relationship to the government); (3) its 
relationship to the population; (4) its relationship to other armed actors; (5) its 
organization, to include size, strength and cohesion. 
This analysis demonstrates that the two ideal type insurgencies (grievance-based 
and greed-based) usually identified in the literature exhibit differences across these five 
characteristics.  For example, grievance-based insurgencies have high political and/or 
ideological objectives—they have a fundamental disagreement with the government and 
are fighting to force a change in power.  Any economic opportunities presented to a 
grievance-based insurgency are only exploited to aid in achieving their ultimate 
objective.  Meanwhile, greed-based insurgencies are only interested in profiting from the 
illicit economy; yet, they may have to participate in some political maneuvering to 
maintain access to the illicit economy.   
Grievance-based insurgencies need popular support to achieve victory.  
Therefore, they recruit heavily by trying to convince the population that their ideology is 
superior to that espoused by the government.  Greed-based insurgencies recruit or exploit 
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the population to aid in their illicit activities.  Unlike grievance-based insurgencies that 
are under constant pressure to recruit, greed-based insurgencies only recruit when 
necessary because they are able to sustain their organization through the profits they earn. 
In terms of other armed actors, grievance-based insurgencies might be more 
inclined than greed-based insurgencies to form alliances.  Two grievance-based 
insurgencies with different ideologies, but similar goals of overthrowing the government, 
might be tempted to join forces, if only temporarily, until the government has been ousted 
from power.  Greed-based insurgencies, on the other hand, view other armed actors as 
potential threats to their economic interests.  Therefore, any encroachment on their turf 
will be met with extreme hostility. 
Lastly, the two types of insurgency vary in organizational structure.  A grievance-
based insurgency derives its size and strength from the number of recruits it possesses; 
yet, no matter what size, it will be a relatively cohesive group since all participants 
presumably share the same ideology.  A greed-based insurgency's size will largely 
depend on how much it is able to participate in the illicit economy.  Essentially, it will 
grow until checked by the government or some other force.  Cohesion is questionable, 
however, since the organization has to constantly be prepared to deal with members that 
may try to embezzle profits for personal gain. 
The chapter goes on to introduce the counterinsurgency strategies most commonly 
advanced to combat grievance- and greed-based insurgencies.  COIN strategies 
developed during the Cold War viewed gaining popular support as the key to defeating 
grievance-based insurgencies.  The two most-widely accepted strategies are the "hearts 
and minds" (HAM) and cost-benefit theories.  Greed-based insurgencies have only come 
to the forefront in the last fifteen to twenty years.  The newer COIN strategies promoted 
to defeat greed-based insurgencies often resemble strategies used to target organized 
crime, i.e., the targeting of assets or economic sanctions.  None of these strategies were 
developed to target insurgencies with dual motivations.  In circumstances involving 
insurgencies with dual motivations, the common practice has been to use some 
combination of grievance- and greed-based COIN strategies. 
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To complete this analysis, the last section of the chapter introduces the term 
“resource-based” insurgency to describe insurgencies that demonstrate dual motivations.  
The term "resource" is used because this type of insurgency has economic interests in 
"lootable resources" (commodities that provide income when sold).5  These interests, at 
times, force them to behave in similar fashion to greed-based insurgencies; however, like 
grievance-based insurgencies, they maintain an ideology and retain the ultimate goal of 
fighting for their political causes.  Like the first two types of insurgency, resource-based 
insurgencies are analyzed in relation to the five characteristics listed above.  From this 
analysis, the conclusion is drawn that existing COIN strategies for grievance- and greed-
based insurgencies will be ineffective against resource-based insurgencies.  Instead, a 
new strategy is proposed that focuses on territory as the center of gravity. 
Chapter III will superimpose the general discussion of grievance-, greed-, and 
resource-based insurgencies introduced in Chapter II onto the situation in Colombia.  It 
will begin with a historical overview of the FARC to provide the reader a better 
understanding of the organization.  Particular attention will be given to the evolution of 
the FARC from its ideological beginnings to its increased involvement in the illegal drug 
trade.  Next, the FARC will be analyzed in terms of the five characteristics listed in 
Chapter II. 
This analysis reveals that the FARC most closely resembles a resource-based 
insurgency.  The FARC's relationship to the population has become more hostile and 
exploitive in parallel with its increased involvement in the drug trade.  The FARC has 
also become increasingly hostile toward other armed actors, especially the AUC and 
Colombian Army, which have tried to encroach on their territory.  The size and strength 
of the FARC has also rapidly increased due, in large part, to the participation in the drug 
trade.  The FARC has recruited more cadres and has been able to arm them with weapons 
purchased with drug profits.  As with any organization, this rapid increase in size may  
 
 
                                                 
5 Collier and Hoeffler, "Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War," 1. 
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have some negative repercussions for the internal cohesion of the FARC.  All of these 
factors are taken into consideration in the policy recommendations given in the next 
chapter. 
Chapter IV begins with a background discussion of U.S. and Colombian policy 
toward the FARC since 2001.  Plan Colombia, ACI, Plan Patriota, and the Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy of Colombia have worked together, but also at cross-
purposes since 2001.  U.S. policy toward Colombia has largely focused on counterdrug 
efforts.  On the other hand, the Colombians have long been more interested in achieving 
security, which involves much more than simply fighting the drug problem.  The 
availability of U.S. funds for counterterror efforts since 2002 has caused the two 
countries' policies to become more aligned. 
The effectiveness of these policies will be measured by looking at indicators such 
as levels of violence, homicide rates, kidnapping rates, and numbers of insurgents.  The 
trends show that the Colombians are making headway in their war against the FARC.  I 
attribute this to the fact that the Colombians have identified the control of territory as a 
key component of their Democratic Security and Defense Policy, and have made 
significant progress in achieving this objective.  The state's ability to control its territory 
is crucial in defeating a resource-based insurgency.  While Washington has shown its 
support by continuing to fund the Colombian COIN effort, it is not clear that U.S. 
policymakers have explicitly drawn lessons about the correctness of the Colombian 
government's strategy for dealing with a resource-based insurgency. 
The conclusion will summarize the main points of my arguments.  It appears that 
the Colombians are on the right track, but it would be a mistake to underestimate the 
resilience of the FARC.  The current Colombian administration has made security one of 
its primary objectives.  Like in any democracy, however, change is as near as the next 
election.  Therefore, it is important that both Colombia and the United States continue to 
implement and support the correct strategy to defeat the FARC. 
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II. CHARACTERISTICS OF GRIEVANCE-, GREED-, AND 
RESOURCE-BASED INSURGENCIES AND STRATEGIES TO 
DEFEAT THEM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The scholarly work on insurgencies has been extensive over the last fifty years.  
Insurgencies during the Cold War have been analyzed in attempts to understand the 
motivations of insurgencies and to develop effective measures to defeat them.  Following 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, more work was done to understand insurgencies in the 
new international environment.  Most recently, after the events of 9/11, there has been 
greater focus on the insurgencies around the globe as many have been labeled "terrorists."  
This new focus on terrorism, while increasing awareness, has also created confusion by 
lumping all insurgent organizations together.  This has obscured the varying motivations 
of the different insurgencies, promoting the misconception that all organizations can be 
defeated with similar strategies and tactics. 
This section identifies three different types of insurgencies, those based on 
grievance, those based on greed, and those based on some combination of both, which I 
label resource-based insurgencies.  Each type of insurgency demonstrates differences in 
characteristics that help identify it, including its relationship to the illicit economy, its 
relationship to the local population, its political/ideological objectives (its relationship to 
the government), its relationship to other armed actors, and its size and strength.  
Analyzing differences along each of these dimensions helps not only to identify the type 
of insurgency, but also to develop proper strategies and policies to defeat them. 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF GRIEVANCE-BASED INSURGENCIES 
Grievance-based insurgencies are the most familiar type of insurgency because of 
their frequency during the Cold War.  These insurgencies arise due to a sector of the 
population becoming disenchanted with their government and, therefore, organizing into 
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a group with the aim of overthrowing the government.6  The reasons for their 
disenchantment could range from political, ideological, or religious differences to ethnic 
or economic inequality.  Many of the grievance-based insurgencies that arose during the 
Cold War were adopted by one of the superpowers.  Due to the bipolar nature of the Cold 
War, the United States and Soviet Union often supported these insurgencies (or the 
besieged governments) in an attempt to subvert or spread communism.  Despite 
superpower involvement, financial support for insurgents often depended upon the 
insurgency demonstrating its viability, which hinged in large part on having popular 
support.  Although the Cold War dynamic made the situation more complex, in most 
cases, original insurgent motivations were not lost. 
Regardless of superpower involvement, support of the population was critical for 
the survival of grievance-based insurgencies.7  Like any military-type organization, an 
insurgency gains strength in numbers; therefore, a large percentage of an insurgency's 
strength resides in the number of cadres it can recruit.  Grievance-based insurgencies use 
their ideology or shared grievances to recruit.  It is incumbent upon the insurgency to 
convince the potential recruit that the insurgency is right and the government is wrong. 
Because recruitment is based on ideology or shared grievances, the result is a relatively 
cohesive unit. 
The population is also critical because they are the primary resource base—they 
provide food, money, and shelter for the insurgents.  Some elements of the population 
may provide indirect aid to the insurgency without being actively involved in the 
insurgency.  Insurgents often need safe-houses to hide from government actors.  They 
also need hideouts from which to base their operations and attacks against the state.  The 
population can also provide monetary donations which the insurgents can use to purchase  
 
 
                                                 
6 David M. Malone and Jake Sherman, "Economic Factors in Civil Wars: Policy Considerations," in 
Rethinking the Economics of War, 252. 
7 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 
1964); Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1964). 
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weapons or other supplies.  The local population, if convinced that the cause of the 
insurgency is just, can provide all these forms of direct and indirect support to the 
insurgency. 
With a strong support base among the population, and superpower sponsorship, 
grievance-based insurgencies had less need to engage in illegal economic activities to 
make money.  Also, there was less opportunity to engage in illegal economic activities, as 
the world economy was far less global than it is now.  Access to the illicit economy was, 
therefore, much more restricted.  Of course, economic opportunities that arose were not 
likely wasted; yet, the proceeds from illegal activities were expected to support the 
movement and not be used for personal gain.  The primary need for money was to 
purchase weapons through the local or international black market. 
A grievance-based insurgency's burning desire to overthrow the government 
might lead to a tenuous relationship with other illegally armed actors within the state.  
Two insurgencies might be compelled to join forces if the defeat of the government was 
more likely.  Such an agreement would be fragile regardless of the success of the union.  
In-fighting and finger pointing could erupt if the combined insurgency was unsuccessful.  
If the insurgency was successful, a power struggle could emerge, likely resulting in the 
two organizations splitting apart again.  If the two insurgencies are unwilling to join 
forces for some reason, it is unlikely that they would become hostile to each other.  They 
may compete over the population, as neither would want to give up their support base, 
however, becoming embroiled in a conflict with another insurgency would only weaken 
each movement and decrease any likelihood of success against the state. 
1. Strategies/Policies to Defeat Grievance-based Insurgencies 
Discovering an insurgency's center of gravity is crucial to policymakers and 
military strategists tasked with the assignment of developing strategies to combat and 
defeat them.  Only by understanding what holds an insurgency together can a proper 
strategy aimed at that focal point be targeted.  Analysis of grievance-based insurgencies 
shows that the population is their center of gravity.  Without popular support, a grievance 
insurgency cannot exist. 
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The RAND Corporation recently published a report drawing lessons from the last 
fifty years of counterinsurgency.8  This report represents two counterinsurgency theories 
that were developed during the Cold War.  Both theories, "hearts and minds" (HAM) and 
cost/benefit, recognized the population as the center of gravity for grievance-based 
insurgencies.  HAM is the more widely known counterinsurgency theory.  The theory 
argues that an insurgency needs popular support to sustain its organization; conversely, 
the state needs popular support to defeat the insurgency.   
Roger Trinquier, writing about France's involvement in Vietnam and Algeria, 
noted the importance of popular support in a counterinsurgency operation.  The local 
population can provide invaluable intelligence since they "know certain key persons in 
the enemy organization…who live in permanent contact with the population."9  Gaining 
the support of the locals also serves to "cut the guerrilla off from the population that 
sustains him."10  In order to gain popular support, the state must provide security and 
convince the population that it is operating in the best interests of its citizens.11 
Cost/benefit theory countered the basic tenet of HAM theory on how the 
counterinsurgent should gain the support of the population.  Cost/benefit theorists 
focused on the decision-making process of the population.  They concluded that the 
population acted "as rational actors that would respond in more or less predictable ways 
to incentives and sanctions from the competing systems of insurgent and 
counterinsurgent."12  Therefore, a counterinsurgency policy aimed at winning over the 
population must either increase the costs of joining an insurgency, or make it more 
beneficial to not join. 
                                                 
8 Austin Long, On "Other War:" Lessons from Five Decades of RAND Counterinsurgency Research 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2006/RAND_MG482.pdf 
(accessed April, 15, 2007). 
9 Roger Trinquier, Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency (New York: Frederick A. 
Praeger, 1964), 44-45. 
10 Ibid., 64-65. 
11 Austin Long, On "Other War," x. 
12 Ibid., 25. 
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For example, increasing the costs of joining an insurgency might be achieved if 
the odds of capture were high, and punishment was severe and enforced.  Contrastingly, 
increasing the benefits to not join could include monetary incentives, security, or social 
welfare programs.  Cost/benefit theorists emphasized, however, that benefits should not 
be offered to the population without reasonable expectation that those benefits would not 
reach the hands of insurgents.  In other words, benefits should not be given to win the 
hearts and minds of the population, but provided only in exchange for cooperation from 
the population in the counterinsurgency effort.13 
C. CHARACTERISTICS OF GREED-BASED INSURGENCIES 
Led by Paul Collier, a series of controversial studies published by the World Bank 
in the 1990s proclaimed that insurgencies were motivated by access to legal and illegal 
lootable resources, rather than political or ideological grievances.14  Lootable resources 
include commodities such as diamonds, oil, timber, or drugs.  These findings were in 
stark contrast to the conventional wisdom left over from the Cold War that insurgent 
organizations were primarily grievance-based. 
Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank published their findings almost ten 
years after the collapse of the Soviet Union.  The international landscape had 
fundamentally shifted away from a bipolar environment.  The struggles across the globe 
could no longer be explained by the U.S.S.R. versus the United States, or communists 
versus capitalists.  Therefore, a shift in the understanding of insurgency motivations was 
developed.  Collier's statistical analysis found that, "When the main grievances—
inequality, political repression, and ethnic and religious divisions—are measured 
objectively, they provide no explanatory power in predicting rebellion.  These objective 
grievances and hatreds simply cannot usually be the cause of violent conflict."15 Instead, 
                                                 
13 Austin Long, On "Other War," 25. 
14 Collier and Hoeffler, "On Economic Causes of Civil War," working paper (World Bank, 1998); 
Collier and Hoeffler, "Justice-Seeking and Loot-Seeking in Civil War," working paper (World Bank, 
1999); Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," working paper (World Bank, 2001); 
Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy," working paper (World 
Bank, 2000). 
15 Collier, "Economic Causes of Civil Conflict and their Implications for Policy," 21. 
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he argues that insurgencies were motivated by the opportunity to acquire wealth through 
the access to the types of lootable resources described earlier.16 
Greed-based insurgencies can be thought of like organized crime in the United 
States.  Their primary objective is to profit from access to the illicit economy.  In contrast 
to grievance-based insurgencies, they are not determined to overthrow the state.  
Actually, greed-based insurgencies try to limit their contact with the state as much as 
possible.  Like organized crime, greed-based insurgencies prefer to operate under the 
radar, attracting as little state attention to their activities as possible.  Therefore, conflict 
usually originates from state attempts to eliminate the illegal activities of the greed-based 
insurgency.  In these instances, the greed-based insurgency may be compelled to respond 
with force to protect its economic interests.  Barring any intervention by the state, the 
greed-based insurgency is content to simply profit from their illegal activities. 
The greed-based insurgency's interests in lootable resources changes the dynamics 
of its organization and relationship to the population.  The strength of the greed-based 
insurgency is not derived from popular support, as it is with grievance-based 
insurgencies.  Instead, its strength is derived from the profits earned through participation 
in the illicit economy.  This affords them the ability to buy the food, shelter, and supplies 
necessary to maintain the organization.  The size of the insurgency is only restrained by 
the ability of the leadership to maintain control of the organization, or by the ability of 
the state to limit its growth.  The leadership does not want the organization to become so 
large that it loses control to entrepreneurial cadres that might be tempted to embezzle 
funds or strike out on their own.  Nor does it want to attract undue attention from the 
state. 
The reliance on lootable resources causes a greatly decreased reliance on the 
population.  Greed-based insurgencies are not necessarily interested in winning over the 
support of the population, although they still need to recruit to assist in their chosen 
economic activity.  Instead of recruiting by ideology, greed-based insurgencies are able to 
recruit from segments of society that are attracted to the organization by the prospect of 
                                                 
16 Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 2. 
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profiting from it.  Despite their need for recruits, a greed-based insurgency may be 
willing to harm the population if its participation in the illegal activity required it.  Unlike 
grievance-based insurgencies that view the state and state actors as their primary enemy, 
the greed-based insurgency views anyone interfering with their enterprise (including the 
local population) as an enemy to be dealt with harshly. 
Along those lines, a greed-based insurgency will not hesitate to use force against 
competing organizations.  As with organized crime, territory or "turf" becomes highly 
important because it provides access to the lootable resources.  A greed-based insurgency 
will fiercely defend its territory from all encroachers, whether it be the state, other greed-
based insurgencies, or criminal organizations.  This increases the likelihood of violent 
conflict in countries with greed-based insurgencies.  Turf battles between armed non-state 
actors are also likely to lead to high levels of internal displacement and decreased levels 
of popular support for the insurgency. 
1. Strategies/Policies to Defeat Greed-based Insurgencies 
The shift in the relationship with the population for greed-based insurgencies 
causes its center of gravity to be different than grievance-based insurgencies.  A 
counterinsurgent strategy aimed at winning popular support would be largely ineffective 
because the greed-based insurgency is less reliant on the population to maintain its 
organization.  Even if the government had one hundred percent support of the locals, the 
greed-based insurgency would still not be prevented from extorting local businesses, or 
forcing locals into service.  Rather, the focal point of a greed-based insurgency is its 
access to lootable resources.  If that access is removed, the greed-based insurgency will 
be significantly weakened, or disappear altogether. 
Scholars have recognized the importance of economic interests for greed-based 
insurgencies, and recommend economic sanctions that target the finances of 
combatants.17  Such sanctions could include "the suppression of money laundering, 
regulating the export of weapons, combating narcotics trafficking, targeting international 
                                                 
17 David M. Malone and Jake Sherman, "Economic Factors in Civil Wars: Policy Considerations," in 
Rethinking the Economics of War, 241. 
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organized crime, and minimizing the negative impact of private-sector activities."18  
These types of initiatives must be carefully administered, examining each specific case 
before choosing the right combination of sanctions.19 
Sanctions, however, have many drawbacks.  Ballentine points out some of their 
ill-intended consequences: 
sanctions have the effect of raising the value of the targeted activity, 
thereby increasing the economic incentive for less scrupulous profit-
seekers to engage in it.  Likewise, rather than inducing combatants toward 
negotiated settlements, the reduction in revenues from established sources 
can intensify intragroup competition over spoils, while also encouraging 
increased predation of available civilian assets to compensate for lost 
revenues.  In either case, there is a distinct possibility that these sorts of 
supply-side policies will exacerbate both criminality and conflict, at least 
in the short term.20 
Along with possibly intensifying the conflict, Malone and Sherman also argue that 
sanctions often lack "effective implementation and enforcement on the ground, enabling 
open circumvention by smugglers of arms, fuel, natural resources, and other 
commodities."21 
Samuel Porteous recognizes the need to strengthen enforcement of sanctions, but 
still sees them as "the international community's last best alternative to costly and 
destructive military interventions."22 
A thorough financial sanctions program requires only a tiny fraction of the 
financial resources a military deployment would…More work, however, 
needs to be done to establish the appropriate structures and systems 
necessary to establish an efficient financial sanctions enforcement 
mechanism acceptable to the international community.23 
                                                 
18 David M. Malone and Jake Sherman, "Economic Factors in Civil Wars: Policy Considerations," in 
Rethinking the Economics of War, 240. 
19 Ibid., 254. 
20 Karen Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed 
Conflict," in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, 275. 
21 David M. Malone and Jake Sherman, "Economic Factors in Civil Wars: Policy Considerations," in 
Rethinking the Economics of War, 246. 
22 Samuel D. Porteous, "Targeted Financial Sanctions," in Greed and Grievance, 173. 
23 Samuel D. Porteous, "Targeted Financial Sanctions," in Greed and Grievance, 185. 
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On the other hand, I. William Zartman argues that greed-based insurgencies cannot be 
defeated without the use of military force.24  Unfortunately, Zartman does not specify 
what tactics the military should employ. 
The last policy prescription, put forth by Farer, recommends strengthening the 
institutions that punish criminal behavior.25  The illegal activities of greed-based 
insurgencies should be targeted, and those apprehended should be brought to justice.  
This would require that criminal tribunals have the "means for investigating alleged 
crimes, compelling the accused's appearance, conducting fair trials (which is normally 
deemed to include a right of appeal), and executing sentences."26   
D. THE CHARACTERISTICS OF RESOURCE-BASED INSURGENCIES 
The Collier articles were important in moving the debate of insurgency 
motivations away from the traditional beliefs held over from the Cold War.  Many 
scholars acknowledged that Collier's work was important for highlighting the centrality 
of lootable resources to modern insurgencies, but few were ready to agree wholeheartedly 
that insurgent organizations were motivated solely by greed.  Most insurgency scholars 
argue that modern insurgencies are still grievance-driven, but acknowledge that greed has 
altered some of the motivations and characteristics of insurgencies that have gained 
access to lootable resources.27  In fact, even Collier moved away from his position that 
greed was the sole motivator for insurgencies when he acknowledged that grievance 
factors added some "explanatory power" to his model.28 
This debate over the exact motivations of modern insurgencies is ongoing, and 
difficult to resolve without the ability to read the minds of insurgents around the world.  
                                                 
24 I. William Zartman, "Need, Creed, and Greed in Intrastate Conflict," in Rethinking the Economics of 
War, 283. 
25 Tom Farer, "Shaping Agendas in Civil Wars: Can International Criminal Law Help?" in Greed and 
Grievance, 206. 
26 Ibid., 219. 
27 Arnson and Zartman, ed., Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and 
Greed; Ballentine and Sherman, ed., The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and 
Grievance; Berdal and Malone, ed., Greed and Grievance: Economic Agendas in Civil War. 
28 Collier and Hoeffler, "Greed and Grievance in Civil War," 16. 
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It is safe to say that many modern insurgent organizations retain a mixture of greed and 
grievance motivations.  After all, insurgencies need some source of funding to maintain 
their movement.  If insurgencies are able to profit from the illicit economy, they can rely 
less on popular support for funding. However, the act of establishing economic 
enterprises only adds to, but does not replace, the grievance motivations of the 
insurgency. 
It is important to understand the implications of the mixed political, ideological, 
and economic objectives of resource-based insurgencies.  They may still ultimately wish 
to overthrow the government, but failing that, they maintain an interest in their economic 
activities and therefore have less reason to negotiate for peace.   As Arnson points out, 
"civil wars previously defined as political rebellions (to which the state responds through 
counterinsurgency) need to be understood in terms of the interest of rebels, warlords, or 
armed gangs who benefit from violent economic activity and therefore have incentives to 
prolong conflict as well as sabotage peacemaking efforts."29  Also, Ballentine argues that 
insurgencies' interests in maintaining access to lootable resources may generate new 
grievances, especially if that access is restricted or denied.  These new grievances add to 
the already existing grievances, providing more cause for hostilities and lengthening the 
conflict.30 
The mixed objectives of a resource-based insurgency are beneficial to its size and 
strength, yet potentially detrimental to its cohesion.  A resource-based insurgency 
benefits because it can recruit similar to a grievance- or a greed-based insurgency.  It can 
attract recruits through its ideology, or by appealing to poor peasants attracted by the 
possibility of profiting from the insurgency's economic enterprises.  This increased 
recruitment pool allows a resource-based insurgency to grow rapidly, if the need arises.  
Also, the strength of the insurgency increases because it has a dual resource base, popular 
support and profits from its illicit activities. 
                                                 
29 Cynthia Arnson, "The Political Economy of War: Situating the Debate," in Rethinking the 
Economics of War, 8. 
30 Karen Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed 
Conflict," in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, 267-268. 
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The dual resource base, however, forces the insurgency to perform a delicate 
balancing act to maintain internal cohesion.  The resource-based insurgency must 
indoctrinate all its new recruits, who now demonstrate a mixture of motivations—those 
that joined for the ideological cause, and those that joined for the economic cause.  As 
Ballentine points out: 
increased combatant access to economic capital may have worked to 
undermine their acquired social capital, both by enabling quicker rates of 
recruitment, which may strain a combatant group's ability to socialize new 
recruits to the group's ideological cause, and by attracting recruits for 
whom the prospect of financial benefit is more important than ideological 
conviction or political aims.31 
These mixed motivations can potentially create an internal schism if the leadership is not 
able to indoctrinate new recruits effectively or efficiently. 
Also, as wealth is amassed from the sale of lootable resources, the resource-based 
insurgency may become less reliant on popular support.  As reliance on popular support 
decreases, the resource-based insurgency may resort to threat or forcible coercion as a 
means to recruit. 32  Coerced recruitment presents another leadership challenge because it 
increases the need for strict discipline among the ranks.  Recruits that are forced into 
service may attempt to escape, or worse, undermine the movement.  Discipline must 
remain high to avoid such problems.  Therefore, the ability to rapidly increase in size 
through recruitment (voluntary or coerced) may prove detrimental to the internal 
cohesion of the organization. 
The dual resource base also presents difficulties when the insurgency is 
challenged by other armed actors.  Protecting access to lootable resources often becomes 
a prime objective, forcing the resource-based insurgency to behave similar to a greed-
based insurgency, i.e., any threats to access of lootable resources are dealt with harshly.  
Often the fight over resources comes at the expense of the population, as innocent non-
combatants are caught in the cross-fire.  This inevitably causes the popular support for 
                                                 
31 Karen Ballentine, "Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed 
Conflict," in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, 270. 
32 Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, introduction to The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: 
Beyond Greed and Grievance, 8. 
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the insurgency to wane.  Once this occurs, the resource-based insurgency becomes 
increasingly like a greed-based insurgency, using coercion to recruit. 
A resource-based insurgency is less likely to join forces with an insurgency that 
shares similar ideological convictions, if the union would require sharing profits from the 
illicit economy.  In fact, resource-based insurgencies with a tremendous economic base 
might feel less of a need to look for outside assistance if they have enough money to 
provide for their soldiers.  Joining forces with another organization would only force 
them to share their profits and share power after their expected victory over the state.  In 
this regard, resource-based insurgencies are also less susceptible to international 
influences.  Unlike grievance-based insurgencies of the Cold War period, resource-based 
insurgencies are more resistant to external support because it is not as necessary as it was 
in the past. 
1. Strategies/Policies to Defeat Resource-based Insurgencies 
Once again, the center of gravity has shifted for this third type of insurgency.  
Resource-based insurgencies share characteristics with both grievance- and greed-based 
insurgencies.  As with grievance-based insurgencies, a critical objective for resource-
based insurgencies is overthrowing the government, or having the government capitulate 
to certain grievances.  Increasing the size and strength of the insurgency is necessary to 
achieve this objective.  Resource-based insurgencies achieve this two ways—by enlisting 
the support of the population, and by amassing wealth through the sale of lootable 
resources.  The reliance on lootable resources causes the resource-based insurgency to 
share some characteristics with greed-based insurgencies, namely its relationship to the 
population and other armed actors. 
The recognition of the shared characteristics of a resource-based insurgency might 
lead to the misguided approach of combining existing grievance- and greed-based COIN 
strategies.  That is, a strategy that combined gaining popular support (either HAM or 
cost/benefit) with targeting illicit funding sources (economic sanctions or strengthened 
criminal institutions).  This approach would be flawed since there exists one means of 
deterring both sources of insurgent strength—establishing state control of territory. 
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If done correctly, state control of territory accomplishes two goals 
simultaneously:  (1) it reduces insurgent access to the population, (2) it reduces insurgent 
access to lootable resources.  The center of gravity for resource-based insurgencies, 
therefore, is not popular support, nor the source of funding, but access to territory not 
controlled by the state. 
At this point, it is important to define the "control of territory."  An actor, either 
state or non-state, can be said to control an area when it has a monopoly on the use of 
force for that region.  In most advanced countries, it is taken for granted that the state has 
the monopoly on the use of force.  The state has law enforcement agencies or a military 
to maintain control.  This is predicated on an established rule of law that is commonly 
accepted, or at least understood, by the population.  Consequently, if a law is broken, it is 
expected that the state will attempt to bring the criminal to justice; or, if violence breaks 
out in a region, the state will use necessary force to restore order. 
In countries with insurgencies, the monopoly on the use of force is contested, thus 
control of territory is contested.  A grievance-based insurgency ultimately wishes to 
replace the state's monopoly on the use of force throughout the country.  A greed-based 
insurgency contests the state's use of force to restrict the insurgency's illegal economic 
activities.  A resource-based insurgency shares both of these objectives.  It desires to 
overthrow the state and, thus, needs to recruit an "army" of its own.  It also need to 
protect its source of funding used to equip, train, feed, and clothe its "army." 
How a counterinsurgency policy attacks this center of gravity (territory) is critical.  
The counterinsurgent must remember that challenging a resource-based insurgency’s 
access to lootable resources will cause it to behave like a greed-based insurgency.  If 
forced, it may be willing to eschew popular support in exchange for access to the illicit 
economy, knowing that it has the power to coerce recruits as needed.  Likewise, a COIN 
campaign aimed solely at gaining control of the population will also force the insurgency 
to become more reliant on its alternate resource base, the illicit economy, resulting in a 
similar outcome.  This seemingly makes winning over the population by the 
counterinsurgent a less important objective. 
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On the other hand, if the counterinsurgent were successful at eliminating the 
insurgency’s access to the illicit economy, the insurgency would be forced to resort to 
popular support as its primary source of funding.  Also, efforts to take control of territory 
will invariably require the support of the people living in those areas.  A state that ignores 
this requirement will meet greater resistance and possibly push non-combatants to the 
side of the insurgency.  Therefore, the population cannot be ignored by the 
counterinsurgent.  A strategy aimed at controlling the territory must also include a 
campaign to gain the support of the population, which would include either a HAM or 
cost/benefit approach. 
By controlling the territory, the state has the means available to better implement 
either a cost/benefit or a HAM strategy.  For example, a non-combatant might be less 
tempted to join an insurgency if he had a high expectation of capture due to an increased 
state presence in his town, or the state offered better incentives to not join.  Similarly, 
state control of territory reduces a non-combatant's probability of being coerced into 
joining an insurgency by providing security to the region.  Also, strengthening criminal 
institutions and enforcing economic sanctions will become easier with greater control of 
territory by the state.  These policies are largely toothless in areas without state presence. 
That said, there are limits to using a popular support strategy.  Remember, the 
purpose of gaining popular support is to encourage non-combatants to side with the 
government (as opposed to the secondary goal of winning back those that have already 
joined an insurgency).  The objective is to contain the size and strength of the insurgency 
so that it can then be defeated militarily or forced to the negotiating table.  Therefore, a 
COIN strategy aimed at winning popular support will only be effective in areas populated 
by non-combatants.  In the case of resource-based insurgencies, some, or all, parts of 
their organization are based around territories where their lootable resources are located.  
In these areas, they have may have already consolidated their power, either by recruiting 
the local population, or evicting or killing dissidents.  A COIN strategy aimed at 
controlling the population would be largely ineffective in these regions. 
So, a COIN strategy aimed at the control of territory, with special consideration 
given to simultaneously winning over the population, would achieve the desired outcome.  
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Regaining control of territory used by a resource-based insurgency to access lootable 
resources would cut off a major source of funding for the insurgency.  At the same time, 
as territory, and the population in it, are controlled by the state, the resource-based 
insurgency loses its second source of funding. 
As the state increases control of the territory (along with control of the 
population), the insurgency will be left with no other option than to move into more 
remote regions of the country where the state has not yet exerted control.  These remote 
regions may still provide access to lootable resources, but access to markets becomes 
increasingly difficult.  If the state is unable to retake the region due to terrain or other 
impediments, it can consolidate control around those regions, thereby isolating the 
insurgency.  Also, these remote regions are likely to be less inhabited, providing a 
smaller recruitment pool to the insurgency.  This slow, but steady reduction in access to 
lootable resources and the population will eventually be enough to force the resource-
based insurgency to negotiate or disband. 
E. CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the recognition of insurgency motivations has broadened since the 
research conducted by the World Bank.  The increased awareness of the economic 
motivations of insurgencies has led to a new set of counterinsurgency policy 
recommendations focused on targeting assets and economic sanctions.  This differs from 
the recommendations to target the population that emerged during the Cold War to 
combat ideological insurgencies.  Unfortunately, determining the motivations of an 
insurgency can be a difficult task, as some insurgencies appear to have both ideological 
and economic motivations.  In these cases, the policymaker is helpless in determining the 
correct COIN strategy to adopt, as all options available will lead to failure.  This chapter 
has analyzed the characteristics of the two established types of insurgency—grievance-
based and greed-based—and the strategies and policies recommended to defeat them.  A 
third type of insurgency—resource-based—was introduced, its characteristics analyzed, 
and a course of action suggested that differs slightly from those already recommended. 
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A resource-based insurgency derives a large portion of its strength from its access 
to lootable resources which are sold for profit.  These economic interests expand the 
recruiting pool for the insurgency, increasing the size and strength of the organization.  It 
also allows the insurgency to buy food, supplies, and weapons.  These economic 
interests, however, can potentially alter a resource-based insurgency’s relationship to the 
population and relationship to other armed actors. 
These characteristics highlight the potential problems of using existing COIN 
strategies to combat resource-based insurgencies.  Instead, a COIN strategy for resource-
based insurgencies should focus first on controlling territory that provides the insurgency 
access to the lootable resources, while simultaneously controlling the population within 
that territory.  This is a task that can only be accomplished by utilizing military and 
police forces.  The wealth available to resource-based insurgencies enables them to 
stockpile arsenals capable of defeating many of the militaries they face.  The battle will 




III. HISTORY AND EVOLUTION OF THE FARC AND 
COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter provided the framework for analysis when looking at an 
insurgency.  It made the case for examining the characteristics of an insurgency to 
determine an effective counterinsurgency policy.  This chapter will apply that framework 
to the FARC, arguably Colombia's most dangerous insurgency.  It will follow the FARC's 
transition from a communist-based campesino organization to a major trafficker in 
cocaine and heroin.  This transition has led to great debate about the FARC's current 
motivations.  Do they still maintain their ideological roots and wish to replace the 
government?  Or, has the quest for profits from narcotrafficking superseded their political 
objectives? 
To begin, a brief history of the FARC is presented to give the reader the necessary 
background on the insurgency.  Next, Colombia's historical response to the FARC will be 
analyzed, attempting to show why Colombia has lacked the ability to respond to the 
threat within its borders.  Once the background is set, the FARC's characteristics will be 
analyzed, with careful consideration given to changes in those characteristics over time.  
The conclusion is that there have been significant changes in four of the five 
characteristics, with only the FARC's political/ideological objectives remaining constant.  
These current characteristics show that the FARC is a resource-based insurgency, and 
that territory is its centers of gravity. 
B. FARC BACKGROUND 
The FARC has been the primary insurgent faction in Colombia since its inception 
in 1966.  The FARC emerged from a bloody and tumultuous period in Colombian history 
known as La Violencia.  During this period, 1948-1964, the two primary political parties 
in Colombia, the Liberals and Conservatives, mobilized against each other "in an 
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undeclared civil war that claimed over 200,000 lives."33  While the Liberals and 
Conservatives massacred each other in horrendous fashion, members of the Colombian 
Communist party organized peasants into 'self-defense' groups to defend themselves and 
their property.34  These 'self-defense' groups were the precursor to the FARC. 
La Violencia ended with the formation of the National Front, an agreement 
between the Liberals and Conservatives to alternate control of the government.  No 
longer fighting against each other, the Liberals and Conservatives refocused their 
energies on eliminating other political threats, including the Communist party.  In 1964, 
the Colombian military took action against five Communist municipalities in the Tolima 
province, located 140 miles southwest of Bogotá.  The Colombian government 
considered the offensive a military success as the Communist enclaves were destroyed.  
However, the majority of the communists were neither killed nor captured, and they 
would later rejoin to form the FARC.35 
Originally, the FARC maintained its connection to the Communist Party.  They 
adopted the Colombian Communist Party's slogan of la combinacion de todas las formas 
de lucha, or "the combination of all forms of struggle."  The strategy of the mantra was 
simple:  to "use all the tools…at their disposal to fight off and eventually topple the 
government."36  However, the rebels soon became the leaders of the organization and the 
Communist Party began to lose control.37  Even as the FARC superseded the Communist 
Party and became its own institution, it did not desert its original political and ideological 
goals.  The FARC maintained its vision of replacing the government with "some form of 
socialist system in Colombia."38 
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From its inception through the early 1980s, the FARC maintained a rather small 
presence in the countryside.  "In its early stages, FARC guerrillas engaged in ambushes 
of military units and raids on farms.  The main objectives were capturing military 
equipment, securing food and supplies, capturing hostages, and settling scores with 
informers."39  The FARC was far from ready to engage in large operations aimed at the 
overthrow of the government.  In fact, the FARC "was more concerned with survival in 
the face of a determined effort by the Colombian army to eliminate it."40   
During this time the FARC also began to organize into a military-like structure, 
wearing uniforms and insignia, and developing "fronts" in departments (states) 
throughout Colombia.  One of the outcomes of the FARC's Seventh Conference in 1982 
was an expansion strategy, with the goal of establishing a front in every Colombian 
department.41  A front consists of "combat, support, and infrastructure elements."42  The 
combat units are the core of the front, made up of two or more companies, consisting of 
50-55 fighters each.43  Supporting elements of the front include finance, logistics, 
intelligence, public order, and mass work commissions.44 
Throughout its existence, two of the primary tactics employed by the FARC have 
been kidnapping and extortion.  These activities serve dual purposes.  They perpetuate 
insecurity and instability, creating a burden on the state to halt such activities.  They also 
serve as a form of revenue for the FARC allowing them to buy weapons to commit 
further violent acts against the state.  By the 1980s the FARC became involved in another 
activity that served these dual purposes, but has been much more lucrative—illegal drug 
trafficking.  
The early 1980s witnessed a shift from marijuana to more lucrative coca 
plantations in Colombia, injecting an enormous source of illicit money into the economy.  
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Drug traffickers, eager to cash in, began moving into FARC-controlled regions of 
Colombia to set up shop.  At first, the FARC were able to profit from the drug trade by 
taxing coca farmers in exchange for protection from narco-traffickers.  Realizing the 
profits to be made, the FARC began to tax the narcotraffickers as well.  "Progressively, 
however, the group levied new tariffs on other illegal transactions, from importing 
precursor agents to refining cocaine.  They also demanded rents from the narcos for coca 
paste, protection of labs, and the provision of airstrips."45 
Small-time traffickers, however, soon grew into huge cartels with enough money 
to fund paramilitaries to protect their interests from the FARC.  State-sponsored 
paramilitaries also arose in the 1980s.  Bloody battles over territory have ensued ever 
since.  The FARC has become increasingly involved in the drug trade in the areas they 
have maintained control.  To understand the relationship of the FARC to the drug trade it 
is important to understand the links of the chain.  The International Crisis Group 
describes it best: 
From bottom to top, the drug trade involves the following stages:  
cultivation; harvest; production of first coca paste and then coca base by 
the farmers in primitive, make-shift facilities and cocinas; storage and sale 
of coca base; refinement into cocaine (in more complex laboratories or 
cristalizaderos); transport to transshipment points; transport abroad to 
intermediary points such as Mexico or to final destinations, such as the 
U.S. or Europe; sale in large quantities; sale in small quantities to 
consumers; consumption.46 
The ICG reports that the FARC completely controls the drug chain from cultivation 
through refinement in the departments of Caqueta, Guaviare, and parts of Putumayo, 
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C. COLOMBIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE 
The FARC arose out of a bloody and tumultuous period in Colombian history.  
While the FARC has never been accepted as a legitimate organization, the Colombian 
government has tried multiple tactics to deal with the insurgent organization—from hard-
line to conciliatory, and back again.  There are various reasons for the ineffectiveness of 
the Colombian government to eliminate the FARC from its borders. The geography of the 
country, state fear of a strong military, the allowance of legalized paramilitaries, the lack 
of long-term COIN strategy, the decentralization of state power, and the explosion of the 
cocaine industry all have contributed to Colombia's failure. 
The geography of Colombia is so diverse that it presents multiple difficulties for 
the state to establish its presence.  There is the coastal zone along the Caribbean Sea and 
another coastal zone along the Pacific Ocean.  There are three large mountain ranges that 
run through the country, creating barriers to the valleys between.  The easternmost range 
is the Sumapaz Mountains, beyond which lies the Eastern Plains, making up nearly one-
third of the country.  Each of these areas are diverse ecosystems with different economic 
bases, and are largely independent from the other regions.  These geographical barriers 
have prevented the state from integrating the different regions of the country.  As Vargas 
points out, "geography conspired to inhibit integration by making transportation between 
regions—particularly between the capital, located on the isolated high plateau of the 
central cordillera, and other departments—extremely difficult."48  The weak presence of 
the state in many of its territories has led to power vacuums in those municipalities that 
have been filled by insurgents and/or paramilitaries.49 
Another shortcoming was the Colombian resistance to fund a larger, stronger 
military ensuring the state maintained a monopoly on the use of force.  It was the fear of 
a military coup, an occurrence happening altogether too frequently in Latin America, 
which led the Colombian government to limit military funding.  As Dudley points out, 
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"Fearful of the growing presence of the military in other Latin American countries, 
Colombian politicians deliberately kept their own armed forces just big enough to keep 
the guerrillas in check, but not big enough to threaten their hold on the government."50 
Lack of state strength, presence, and military weakness also contributed to the rise 
of the paramilitaries to combat the FARC.  Legal paramilitaries were created under 
Colombian Army General Fernando Landazabal in the early 1980s.  Frustrated by the 
state's unwillingness to allow the army to fight insurgency as he saw fit, Landazabal took 
advantage of a 1968 Colombian law that authorized citizens to organize into militias.51  
Soon military officers were organizing with local business owners to form "self-defense" 
groups, determined to eliminate subversives from their hometowns.52  State acquiescence 
to "legalized" paramilitaries also contributed to the rise of paramilitaries funded by 
narcotraffickers to protect their interests from the FARC.  The willingness of the state to 
relinquish power to these paramilitaries factionalized the country.  This strategy may 
have been effective in the short term, but only led to the state's delegitimization in the 
long term.53 
Since 1968, the Colombian government has wavered in its stance on the legality 
of paramilitaries.  This can be attributed to the inconsistency of the National Front and its 
long-lasting effects on civil-military relations.  External competition was eliminated 
under the National Front, but internal competition was also limited.  The "out" party felt 
little need to compete and compromise with the "in" party, knowing that their turn in 
power was coming soon enough.  This prevented a long-term, unified approach for 
dealing with insurgencies from ever being adopted.   
Inconsistency continued after the National Front ended, partly attributable to the 
constitutional restriction on presidential reelection.  Until 2006, Colombian presidents 
were allowed to serve only one four-year term in office.  Every four years a new 
president took office and promoted a new strategy for dealing with the FARC.  Efforts to 
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negotiate with the FARC under Betancur (1982-86) and Pastrana (1998-2002) have only 
resulted in the rebuilding and strengthening of the FARC.  These efforts have failed 
because the Colombian government was not bargaining from a position of power. 
The Colombian government also made the mistake of instituting reforms in the 
1980s and 1990s that decentralized national power to the subnational level.  As Eaton 
argues, these reforms only provided guerrillas further means to destabilize the state, due 
in large part to the weakness of police presence in much of the country.54  Insurgents 
abused the reforms to further entrench themselves inside the legitimate political system 
by winning local elections and gaining access to municipal revenues: 
[T]he FARC leadership moved to increase its influence and control over 
local municipal governments in the areas where it has a strong military 
presence.  This strategy was implemented after 1988, when Colombians 
began to directly elect their mayors, and later, in 1991, when the central 
budget was decentralized and municipalities for the first time had 
substantial resources.55 
Again, the root of the failed reforms was the absence of the state's monopoly on the use 
of force.  "Decentralization worsened rather than improved the security situation in 
Colombia because the central government failed to provide one of the few governmental 
functions—public order—that was not decentralized."56 
Lastly, the Colombian government has suffered, and the FARC benefited, from 
the illicit drug economy.  The increasing involvement of the FARC in drug trafficking 
since the 1980s has increased their wealth enormously, allowing them to build up huge 
arsenals.  Colombian government efforts, aided largely by the United States, to reduce 
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significantly the total amount of coca cultivated have been unsuccessful.  Reports of 
FARC annual revenue from drug trafficking are conflicting.   
The United Nations estimates that the FARC's average annual income is 
$342 million of which $204 million comes from the drug trade.  However, 
the Colombian Finance Ministry reports FARC revenue in 2003 at $77.16 
million, of which drug trafficking accounted for $11.54 million.57 
Regardless of the actual amount, the FARC clearly continues to benefit from its activities 
in the drug trade. 
In summary, Colombia has been unable to effectively respond to the FARC threat 
for a variety of reasons, some within its control and some not.  There is little the 
Colombian government can do to change the geography of the country.  Drug traffickers 
and the FARC have been able to benefit from the drug industry under cover of this 
rugged and diverse terrain.  However, the Colombian government did have control over 
the unwillingness to fund a larger military, the inconsistent COIN strategies, and the 
decision to decentralize.  Hindsight is 20/20, and history cannot be changed, but it can be 
learned from.  The next section will compare the history of the FARC with the current 
situation to highlight the necessary COIN strategy needed to defeat the FARC once and 
for all. 
D. EVOLUTION OF THE FARC 
In the beginning, the FARC displayed the characteristics of a grievance-based 
insurgency.  It was an ideological-based organization with the clear political objective of 
removing the government from power and replacing it with a socialist agenda.  It began 
as a relatively small movement that depended largely on a non-combative relationship 
with the population in order to recruit supporters.  Strength was also derived from the 
FARC's ability to fund the organization through means other than popular support, to 




against other non-state armed actors such as the ELN and M-19, neither developing an 
openly friendly nor hostile relationship.  The primary enemy of the FARC was the GOC 
and Colombian Army (COLAR). 
Clearly, the FARC’s relationship to the illicit economy has been the most 
dramatic characteristic shift since the FARC began trafficking drugs in the 1980s.  The 
FARC’s decision to participate in the drug trade has altered three of its remaining 
characteristics—its size and strength, relationship to the population, and relationship to 
other armed actors.  These characteristics have changed in varying degrees, and at 
different times.  The one FARC characteristic that seems to remain unchanged is the 
organization's political/ideological objectives. 
Participation in drug trafficking required FARC access to territory to cultivate, 
harvest, process, and export narcotics.  The FARC established a dominant presence in 
many uncontrolled regions of Colombia, allowing it to profit extensively from the drug 
trade.  These profits have clearly allowed the FARC to grow in size and strength.  It took 
twenty years, from 1966 to 1986, for the FARC to grow from 350 fighters to 3600, but 
only another nine years to grow to 7000 (1995), and another five to max out between 
15,000-20,000 (2000).58  Chernick further points out that, "In the Colombian case, there 
appears to be a clear and direct correlation between the advent of new and abundant 
sources of financing and the territorial expansion and increased intensity of the war."59 
The FARC managed to grow rapidly in size mostly by coercing recruits, including 
children, from poor, remote regions of the country.60  Young, poorly educated recruits 
present a unique challenge to the FARC's cohesion because they must be indoctrinated 
with the FARC’s ideological beliefs.  Evidence suggests that high OPTEMPO, at least in 
                                                                                                                                                 
57 Connie Veillette, "Plan Colombia: A Progress Report," Congressional Research Service (May 
2005): 8-9. 
58 Rabasa and Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth, 26-27. 
59 Chernick, "Economic Resources and Internal Armed Conflicts: Lessons from the Colombian Case," 
in Rethinking the Economics of War, 179. 
60 Paul Saskiewicz, "The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army (FARC-EP): 
Marxist-Leninist Insurgency or Criminal Enterprise?" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, 
December 2005), 94. 
 34
the 1990s, has led to a decline in indoctrination efforts by the FARC.61  In the long term, 
the failure to indoctrinate new recruits may weaken the organization, because they remain 
a potential source of internal strife to the organization. 
The willingness to forcefully coerce recruits has contributed to the decline in the 
FARC's popular support, along with other factors.  In the beginning, the FARC 
maintained a cordial relationship with the population by “protecting” peasant growers 
from narcotraffickers.  The FARC fostered this relationship by using drug money to 
provide social services to the rural poor.   
[T]he FARC has used the drug money to establish local clinics and 
organize public works, such as construction of infrastructure and provision 
of means of transportation.  Indeed, in many municipalities, the FARC has 
been the sole provider of essential public services.62   
These efforts at goodwill certainly made the FARC attractive to peasants in areas with 
little or no contact with the state, thus increasing their recruiting abilities. 
The FARC’s relationship to the population evolved as the FARC was increasingly 
challenged by the GOC and AUC.  The GOC has always recognized the FARC as the 
primary security threat in Colombia; however, the U.S.-led "war on drugs" encouraged 
the GOC to treat the FARC as narcotraffickers, limiting its effectiveness as a COIN force.  
This left room for the AUC to act as the primary COIN force in many regions of 
Colombia.  The AUC’s existence has been controversial, to say the least, considering its 
own involvement in drug trafficking.  Battles between the FARC and AUC have been 
notoriously bloody, often at the expense of peasant non-combatants caught in the cross-
fire. 
The challenge by the AUC and the GOC forced the FARC into an untenable 
position.  In essence, the FARC was forced to choose between maintaining popular 
support among the peasants or protecting access to territory and the drug trade.  A look at 
the suspected massacres perpetrated by the FARC since 1997 indicates that the FARC 
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has largely forsaken popular support in lieu of maintaining access to coca growing 
regions.  While the FARC has never engaged in massacres to the extent the AUC has, 
data gathered by Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch shows an increase in 
FARC violence coincidental with the AUC offensive beginning in 1997.63   
Overall, FARC massacres peaked in 2001, but the International Crisis Group 
notes two key incidents in 2002 that further contributed to the decline of the FARC's 
popular support: 
Brutal 'mistakes' like the killing of 119 innocent people in the church of 
Bellavista (Bojayá, Chocó) in May 2002 in a battle with paramilitaries and 
the launching of home-made rockets against the Presidential Palace during 
Uribe's inauguration on 7 August 2002, which missed but killed 26 
beggars, have had negative repercussions.64 
As the ICG notes, "Sympathy or support has given way in many places to a fear-based  
relationship."65  The increasingly hostile relationship with the population and subsequent 
decline in popular support has had a limited effect on FARC size and strength.  The 
FARC's access to territory eliminated the need of the insurgency to seek shelter among 
the population; and wealth from drug trafficking allowed the FARC to buy required food, 
supplies, and weapons. 
The one characteristic that seems to remain unchanged is the FARC's 
political/ideological objectives.  A memoranda dated 15 October 2001 posted on the 
FARC’s website documents the FARC's grievances with the government.66  A few of 
these grievances include agrarian reform, ending the criminalization of the right to 
protest, punishing corrupt officials, and ending the spraying of coca fields.  Marc 
Chernick notes that the FARC is also demanding “institutional guarantees for political 
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participation that ensures their role in local, regional, and national governance."67  The 
FARC claims that a peace settlement will not be reached until the government addresses 
these grievances.  The fact that this document is almost six years old should not be 
misinterpreted to indicate the FARC's ideological convictions have waned.  From the 
policymaker perspective, it should be assumed that the FARC's position remains 
unchanged, and the FARC will continue to fight until their grievances are adequately 
addressed by the government. 
There are other indicators that the FARC still maintains its political/ideological 
convictions.  The FARC has continued to conduct offensive attacks against the 
government. They conducted a major offensive in 1997, attacking multiple Colombian 
military bases. Also, there were attacks on the Presidential Palace during the inauguration 
of President Uribe in 2002.  These are two examples of attacks more characteristic of a 
grievance-based organization.  If the FARC were only interested in drug trafficking, they 
would act more like a greed-based insurgency, and limit themselves to only defensive 
violence against the state. 
Additionally, if the FARC were solely interested in the profits of the drug trade, 
one would expect to see it use the money for personal enrichment.  However the opposite 
is true: 
The FARC uses its drug profits, which are centrally controlled by its 
secretariat, not for the private enrichment of commanders but for the 
organization.  Few if any local commanders in coca-dominated southern 
FARC territories display wealth (although a cult of expensive guns is 
visible).  Since some fronts became increasingly linked to the coca trade 
and richer than others in the beginning of the 1990s, the FARC started to 
rotate commanders in order to prevent them getting used to better living 
conditions and avoid envy from the poorer fronts.68 
These actions demonstrate that the FARC places organizational objectives ahead of 
personal gain. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
In sum, an examination of the evolution of the FARC demonstrates that the 
organization has morphed from a grievance-based insurgency to a resource-based 
insurgency.  The FARC's 1982 decision to participate in drug trafficking to provide 
another source of income eventually altered many of the characteristics of the FARC.  
Evidence suggests that the FARC still maintains many of the original grievances with the 
Colombian government.  Yet, participation in the illicit economy has possibly generated 
new grievances, specifically uninhibited access to lootable resources.  That is not to say 
that profiting from the drug trade has become the FARC's sole reason for being.  As Marc 
Chernick points out, "resources are always a decisive factor in any sustained armed 
struggle" but "resources are a factor; they are not the factor."69 
The FARC’s involvement in narcotrafficking (its relationship to the illicit 
economy) has had repercussions for the organization.  Evidence shows that the FARC has 
been able to grow in size and strength, but that internal cohesion and popular support may 
have suffered due to the practice of coercing recruits.  Popular support has also declined 
due to increased FARC maltreatment of the population in response to the strengthened 
challenges from the GOC and AUC.  The FARC has largely forsaken popular support in 
exchange for protecting access to territory that provides income through narcotrafficking, 
and safe haven from COIN forces.   
A study of the changes in FARC characteristics reveals, not only that the FARC is 
a resource-based insurgency, but also that territory is its center of gravity.  Access to 
territory has allowed the FARC to grow in size and strength, and has also lessened the 
FARC's reliance on popular support.  Had the insurgency not been challenged by the 
GOC and AUC, the FARC may have continued to seek support among the population.  In 
essence, Colombian COIN forces, especially after 1997, forced the FARC to choose 
between the population and access to territory.  This highlighted the FARC's true center  
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of gravity.  The FARC has demonstrated that it can continue without popular support.  
Without access to territory, however, the FARC loses its source of strength, both 
militarily and economically. 
Access to territory has given the FARC the advantage in the operational factors of 
battlespace and time.70  Access to territory allowed the FARC to participate in drug 
trafficking.  It has also provided the FARC with safe havens, allowing it to organize, 
strengthen, and conduct operations.  The fact that the FARC can exist with little threat 
from the state allows them to prolong the conflict indefinitely.  This allows the FARC to 
be patient, plan carefully, and conduct attacks with high probabilities of success.  It 
would be a mistake to interpret the infrequency of FARC attacks as evidence that 
economic motivations have surpassed political motivations for the FARC, or that the 
organization has weakened to the point of collapse.  As Alexandra Guaqueta notes, "The 
apparent logic of their current behavior is that the longer they wait, the stronger they will 
be militarily and the better will be their bargaining position and ability to secure 
concessions from the government in future negotiations."71 
The conclusion that the FARC is a resource-based insurgency with territory as its 
center of gravity has tremendous implications for potential U.S. and GOC strategies to 
combat the FARC.  These issues will be raised in the next chapter. 
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IV. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS AND COMPARISONS TO 
CURRENT POLICY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The previous examination of the FARC's characteristics led to the conclusion that 
the FARC can be categorized as a resource-based insurgency with territory as its center 
of gravity.  This determination is critical for policymakers to develop a proper 
counterinsurgency strategy to defeat the FARC militarily or through negotiation.  From a 
U.S. policymaker perspective, the FARC has only recently received greater recognition 
as a U.S. security threat.  The events of 9/11 caused Washington to reassess the FARC's 
position in the "global war on terror."  The GOC, on the other hand, has always 
recognized the FARC as a threat to its national security.  The availability of U.S. foreign 
aid for use in "counterterror" operations has provided Bogotá the freedom to pursue an 
aggressive strategy to defeat the FARC. 
This chapter suggests how a counterterror policy aimed at controlling territory 
would affect the FARC's ability to operate.  Next, it offers suggestion on how to control 
territory, giving specific attention to the roles of the military and police.  Finally, current 
U.S. and Colombian policy are compared to the policy proposed here to give an 
indication where improvements can be made. 
B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
An effective counterinsurgency strategy in Colombia must make control of 
territory central to its plan.  State control of territory accomplishes the tasks of limiting 
the FARC's illegal drug trafficking activities, reducing or eliminating FARC safe havens, 
and providing security to those living in fear of FARC oppression.  A GOC strategy 
aimed at controlling all the territory in Colombia, that is, establishing a monopoly on the 
use of force in all regions of the country, would have several repercussions for the FARC. 
First, state control of territory reduces the FARC's advantage in space, which 
provides access to the drug trade and safe havens.  Cocaine and heroin are lootable 
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resources that require land to grow coca and poppy.  The rugged terrain of Colombia 
makes the control of all territory extremely difficult, thus pockets of uncontrollable areas 
would likely remain in the hands of narcotraffickers.  By controlling as much territory 
around these areas as possible, however, the key supply routes necessary to import 
precursors and export product could be cut off.  Any restriction on access to territory 
would reduce funding through the drug trade, forcing the FARC to resort to other tactics. 
Once its most lucrative source of funding was reduced or eliminated, the FARC 
would be expected to increase extortions and kidnappings to make up for the slack.  
However, as state control of territory increases, the opportunities for extortion and 
kidnapping will eventually decline, as well.  The FARC will be less able to extort money 
from citizens and businesses that will have increasing protection from state presence.  
Also, kidnappings will be more difficult to perpetrate because the FARC will have 
reduced safe havens to hide kidnap victims.  Considering the likely inability of the state 
to control all of its territory due to the rugged terrain, kidnappings would most likely 
remain as the FARC's primary method of funding until the end.   
Increased state presence would provide security to non-combatants, as well as 
those that were coerced into joining the FARC.  As indicated, these recruits may not have 
been properly indoctrinated into the organization, and therefore have no incentive to stay 
and fight.  State guarantees of security may provide the opportunity for non-ideological 
members to lay down their weapons and reintegrate into society, thus weakening the 
organization. 
As the FARC's advantage in space shrinks, so does their advantage of time.  No 
longer will the terms of battle be set by the FARC.  Eventually, assuming a long-term and 
consistent GOC strategy of gaining control of territory, the FARC will have two options.  
The FARC will be forced into engagement to protect its access to territory, or it will have 
to disperse among the population.  Open engagement favors the Colombian government, 
which retains the advantage in the operation factor of force, despite the FARC's large 
arsenal. 
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If the FARC opts to disperse among the population, the insurgency would 
suddenly revert to a grievance-based insurgency.  In this case it would be possible for the 
Colombian situation to develop into a situation similar to Vietnam or El Salvador.  No 
longer could FARC members be organized into military-like units, wearing uniforms and 
carrying weapons.  Instead, they would become invisible among the population, relying 
on popular support for food, shelter, and supplies.  Given the FARC's history of treatment 
toward the population—extorting, kidnapping, killing, or coercing them into duty—the 
necessary support would unlikely be forthcoming. 
1. How to Control Territory 
The methods and tactics the Colombians use, and the United States supports, to 
control territory are critical.  Clearly the task will require the use of force, and so the 
immediate question arises as to whether the military or the police should act as the 
primary COIN organization.  The debate always arises about the legitimacy of using 
military forces to fight an internal threat within the borders of Colombia.  Some critics in 
the United States argue against encouraging the use of the Colombian military to fight the 
FARC because it blurs the line between military and police roles: 
Critics contend that the United States should not be expanding the role of 
foreign militaries to perform functions that would not be in line with its 
own laws or those of other democracies.  (The U.S. Posse Comitatus Act 
of 1878 established the principle prohibiting the use of the armed forces in 
law enforcement activities.)  According to this argument, U.S. assistance 
counters other U.S. objectives, such as to promote democracy by ensuring 
civilian control of the military.  Instead, it blurs the distinction between 
police and military functions.72 
Becker makes several arguments for the use of police over the military.  He points 
out that, "Stronger and more numerous police units will deny access to the guerrillas in 
the areas where they work, providing the 'clear and hold strategy' that is needed in 
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guerrilla war…"73  He makes the argument that an oversized military will eventually 
have to downsize after the defeat of the insurgency, while building up the police force 
will have no long-term implications because they "will still have an enlarged role to fill in 
society" after the FARC is defeated.74 
On the other hand, a RAND report written before 9/11, focused greater attention 
on the need to strengthen the Colombia's military. 75  Rabasa and Chalk realized early on 
the importance of establishing a state presence in previously uncontrolled regions.  They 
called for an increase in training by the United States and increased use of force by 
Colombian military units.  This training and use of force should concentrate on two areas.  
First, to develop new concepts of operations to detect, identify, and attack light infantry 
targets; second, to regain control of the major roads and navigable rivers that serve as 
highways for guerrillas and drug traffickers.76  Dearaujo agreed that, "The best strategy 
would be to put military pressure on the FARC to bring its leaders to the negotiation 
table."77 
In order to have a chance for success, the United States should support all use of 
force that the Colombians can bring to the fight.  The FARC's resiliency and military 
strength, as well as Colombia's rugged, diverse terrain present enough challenges to 
require the use of both the military and police.  Force alone, however, will be insufficient.  
U.S. policy must ensure that the Colombians take a more holistic approach that includes 
social, economic, and political components. 
Many scholars contend that military use alone will be insufficient in defeating the 
FARC.  Instead of concentrating on the military aspect, U.S. policy should concentrate on 
moving "the country's politics toward a settlement of the conflict, as well [as] 
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strengthen[ing] the country's weak institutions."78  Marcella makes the best argument, 
noting that a successful COIN campaign will integrate all components, "History shows 
that all successful counterinsurgencies in the modern world have had a strong social, 
economic, and political component to complement the military."79 
The importance of a holistic approach cannot be overstated.  The possibility 
discussed earlier of the FARC reverting from a resource-based insurgency to a grievance-
based insurgency raises an important consideration for the COIN strategy.  This shift 
from would cause the center of gravity to revert from territory to the population.  
Therefore, as the Colombian government increases its control of territory, it must make 
every effort to gain popular support.  The military and police must be respectful of the 
local citizenry and avoid human rights violations at all costs.  Social, economic, and 
political aspects of the campaign should immediately follow the control of territory.  
Only this combined approach will secure the support of the populations, further 
strengthening the COIN effort. 
C. HOW U.S. POLICY COMPARES 
Prior to 9/11, U.S. policy support for Plan Colombia specifically prohibited the 
use of monies for counterinsurgency/counterterror operations in Colombia.  Essentially, 
the United States assessed the FARC through a counterdrug lens.  The logic was that 
"drying up funding from drugs w[ould] undermine the guerrillas' strength."80  The 
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attacks, thereby lessening the need for the paramilitaries.81  Only when the FARC was 
substantially weakened, would the Colombian government be in an advantageous 
position to negotiate with the FARC.82   
There were two fundamental flaws with this approach.  First, it assumed that the 
FARC earned most or all of its money through the drug trade.  However, as early as 
1999, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State, Rand Beers stated that only 30-40 percent of 
FARC income came from the drug trade.83  The percentage of FARC wealth earned 
through the drug trade is a constant source of debate.  The fact that the FARC also uses 
kidnapping and extortion as alternate sources of funding has never been in dispute.  
Therefore, had the war on drugs been successful, one could anticipate a rise in 
kidnapping and extortions, rather than a decrease in FARC violence. 
This leads to the second flaw of U.S. policy, the assumption that the war on drugs 
would be successful, which, by most accounts, has not been the case.  A recent report by 
the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) announced an increase in price and 
decrease in quality of cocaine 2005, an indication that supply has decreased.84  But, this 
report has been largely unsubstantiated.  Overall, it is safe to say that it could never be 
determined if eliminating the drug trade would have forced the FARC to disband.  
Ultimately, the U.S. policy benefited the FARC because it prevented the Colombians 
from using U.S. foreign aid to directly combat the FARC. 
1. U.S. Policy Since 9/11 
The events of September 11, 2001 caused a fundamental shift in U.S. foreign and 
domestic policy that will likely remain for decades to come.  This shift has had 
implications for U.S. foreign policy in Colombia.  Organizations like the FARC, ELN, 
and AUC, labeled "terrorist" before 9/11, suddenly drew new attention from the United 
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States.  It is important to note that, while incorporated into the global war on terror, the 
FARC is vastly different than Islamist terrorist organizations in the Middle East.  Vauters 
and Smith compare the FARC to Al Qaeda: 
First, Al Qaeda is primarily a clandestine operation widely dispersed 
around the globe.  It coordinates its work through a network of franchises, 
which include a diverse array of members from several different nations 
who speak a variety of languages.  The FARC, on the other hand, are not 
clandestine at all.  They control large swathes of territory.  Their forces 
resemble an army.85   
These differences, and the fact that the United States has thus far been unwilling to 
commit combat troops to Colombia, require a different U.S. policy than in Afghanistan or 
Iraq. 
U.S. aid for counterterror operations in Colombia first became available in 2002, 
when "the Administration requested, and Congress approved, expanded authority to use 
U.S. counternarcotics funds for a unified campaign to fight both drug trafficking and 
terrorist organizations in Colombia."86  This subtle change to the Andean Counterdrug 
Initiative represented the first shift in U.S. policy resulting from 9/11.  Interestingly, the 
rest of ACI has remain unchanged, conveying that counterdrugs remains the primary U.S. 
focus in Colombia. 
Therefore, the shift in policy in 2002 indicates that there is no definitive U.S. 
counterterror policy for Colombia.  The Congressional Research Service notes that U.S. 
policymakers "favor expanding the scope of military assistance to strengthen the ability 
of Colombian security forces to combat the leftist guerrillas and to expand their control 
throughout rural areas…"87  However, specific guidelines on how to do this are nowhere 
to be found.  In essence, Washington is relying on Bogotá to develop the best strategy to 
defeat the FARC, and hoping they use U.S. money wisely to implement that strategy.  
The current strategy developed by the Uribe administration appears to be having success. 
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D. HOW COLOMBIAN POLICY COMPARES 
From the outset, Colombia's goals for Plan Colombia have differed from U.S. 
goals.  As noted, initial U.S. support for Plan Colombia was "to prevent the flow of 
illegal drugs into the United States, as well as to help Colombia promote peace and 
economic development because it contributes to regional security in the Andes."  On the 
other hand, Colombia's objectives were "to promote peace and economic development, 
and increase security."88  The "global war on terror" has allowed for a convergence of 
U.S. and Colombian policy.  Washington is still very much concerned with the flow of 
illegal drugs originating from Colombia, but the allowance of U.S. funds to be used for 
'counterterror' has given Bogotá the freedom to pursue a security-driven policy. 
President Alvaro Uribe, elected in 2002 on a platform of increasing security in 
Colombia, has specifically targeted the guerrilla and paramilitary threats.  Uribe has lived 
up to his promises taking a hard-line approach in negotiations with the FARC.  He has 
maintained that "the government would only negotiate with those groups who are willing 
to give up terrorism and agree to a cease-fire."89  Negotiations with the paramilitaries 
have begun under Uribe, but the FARC still refuse to lay down their arms.   
To increase the pressure on the FARC, Uribe has increased the size of the military 
and police through  a "one-time 1.2% tax on wealthy individuals and businesses."90  In 
2003, the military launched Plan Patriota, "a campaign to recapture FARC-held 
territory."91  Evidence suggests that this campaign has been successful: 
The Colombian military claims that Plan Patriota has reduced FARC 
ranks from 18,000 to 12,000 in the past year.  Information provided by the 
Office of the Colombian President reports that the campaign was able to 
take back control of 11 FARC-run villages, destroy more than 400 FARC 
camps, capture 1,534 explosive devices and 323 gas-cylinder bombs, kill 
2,518 combatants, and capture large amounts of ammunition and weapons.  
With regard to FARC drug trafficking activities, as of September 2004, it 
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was reported that the Colombian military located and destroyed more than 
47 tons of solid chemical supplies, 18,000 gallons of liquid precursors, 
half a ton of cocaine base, and $34,000 in cash.92 
Despite these reported successes, critics of Plan Patriota claim that the war against the 
FARC will never be won due to Colombia's rugged terrain and the negative repercussions 
of increased internally displaced persons (IDP): 
The Colombian government reports that displaced persons dropped 37% 
from 2003, while a Colombian human rights groups reported that levels 
increased 39% from 208,000 in 2003 to 289,000 in 2004, many of whom 
have not registered with the Colombian government as displaced.93 
Fundación Seguridad y Democracia has recently published a number of statistics 
on violence in Colombia.94  Between 2001 and 2006 the homicide rate per one hundred 
thousand inhabitants has significantly dropped from a peak of 65.9 in 2002, to 34.9 in 
2006.  Kidnappings under Uribe have also decreased by 56% from the previous 
administration.  On the other hand, the expected rise in violent conflicts associated with a 
military campaign are evident.  The total number of battles during Uribe's first term was 
8,001, up from 3,211 during the previous administration.  The total number of FARC 
attacks against the police are also up from 963 to 1,580.  Despite the increase in violence, 
"Most observers agree that public safety conditions in Colombia have improved."95  The 
question remains will the situation continue to improve?  Has Colombia, with the support 
of U.S. funding, developed a long-term strategy that will defeat the FARC and restore 
stability in the region? 
1. Colombian Policy Since 9/11 
President Uribe's administration has developed a comprehensive and effective 
strategy aimed at defeating the FARC.  The first three strategic objectives of Colombia's 
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Democratic Security and Defense Policy are in the perfect order.  First, consolidate state 
control of Colombia's territory; second, provide security to the population; third, 
eliminate the illegal drug trade.96  The Colombians have come to the correct conclusion 
that only after Colombian territory is under state control will the government be able to 
strengthen the rule of law, establish economic and social institutions, and build the 
infrastructure necessary to win the support of the population and defeat the FARC.   
It is imperative that Colombia maintains this course of action until the FARC has 
been defeated or brought to the negotiation table.  However, it would be unwise to try to 
negotiate with the FARC until state control of Colombian territory has been consolidated.  
Recently, president Uribe moved away from his initial stance of not negotiating with the 
FARC unless they agreed to lay down their arms.  The Uribe administration was 
engaging the FARC in a possible prisoner exchange until the FARC was blamed for a car 
bomb that exploded near a military university in Bogotá.97  The FARC's willingness to 
perpetrate such acts of terror shows that negotiations at this point would be fruitless. 
The argument for negotiating with the FARC will not be appropriate for some 
time.  The Colombians must be in a position of power to negotiate, and must be able to 
enforce the settlement.  Without control of significant amounts of Colombia's territory, 
the government is still conceding the operational factors of both time and space to the 
FARC.  As long as the FARC controls some territory to establish a base of operation, 
they can control their destiny.  They conduct attacks on their timeline, at minimum risk to 
themselves.  Additionally, their control of territory allows them to continue in drug 
trafficking, providing them with enough money to buy weapons, thus increasing their 
operational factor of force.  From this perspective, the Colombian government is a long 
way off before it will be in a position to negotiate a peace settlement with the FARC. 
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Colombia must continue to place pressure on the FARC in hopes of eliminating 
one more illegally armed group operating within its borders.  The measures of success are 
good thus far.  Colombian police now have a presence in 95% of Colombia's 
municipalities.  Homicide rates are down by almost half between 2002 and 2005.  
Kidnappings are also down from 3,700 in 2000 to 800 in 2005.98  These numbers indicate 
that the GOC is doing a better job at providing security to its citizens.   
Another important measure of success will be the amount of money the FARC 
earns through the drug trade.  FARC revenues from drug trafficking for 2003 are 
estimated to range from $200 million to over $600 million.99  The ranges of income vary 
greatly because it is difficult to determine the how much the FARC earns through the 
illicit drug economy.  An easier indicator might prove to be the land under FARC control 
or hectares used for coca cultivation.  In terms of hectares under coca cultivation, the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy reported a decline of 8% between 2004 and 2005.  
The above measures are all positive indicators that Colombia is moving in the right 
direction. 
Under Plan Colombia, Washington recognized the ties of the FARC to the illicit 
drug economy, and decided that the best way to defeat the FARC was to attack the drug 
industry, thereby eliminating the FARC's strength.100  However, Plan Colombia was 
primarily a counterdrug policy.  Therefore, the strategies implemented, such as 
eradication and alternative development, were aimed more specifically at counterdrugs 
than counterterror.  It could be argued that prior to 9/11 the United States did not really 
care about the existence of the FARC, and eliminating the FARC's resource base was 
only a convenient by-product of Washington's primary concern, reducing the amount of 
Colombian drugs entering the United States.  Gordon Passage, writing in 2000, made this 
observation about U.S. policy,  
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We have tied our policy toward Colombia in a knot by determinedly 
confining our objectives—and therefore our supporting assistance—to 
counternarcotics programs, repeatedly reaffirming that we would not be 
drawn into that country's internal strife.101 
By most accounts Plan Colombia has been largely ineffective.  Despite successful 
eradication in certain regions, the overall flow of drugs into the United States has 
remained stable, despite these successes.102  Therefore, it could never be determined if 
drying up the FARC's resources from the illicit drug economy would have forced the 
FARC to disband.  Since 9/11, there has been no specific U.S. counterterror policy to 
replace Plan Colombia.  Instead, there have only been modest changes to the Andean 
Counterdrug Initiative, which now allows counterdrug monies to also be used for 
counterterror operations. 
The United States National Security Strategy for Terrorism is a broad document 
that lumps the FARC in with all other terrorist organizations in the world.  It speaks in 
broad strategies and does not identify the specific strategies needed for any one terrorist 
organization.  The closest the Strategy comes to identifying territory as a center of gravity 
is on page 22:  
The United States will work in concert with our international and regional 
partners to ensure effective governance over ungoverned territory, which 
could provide sanctuary to terrorists.  Where there is a clear indication of 
terrorist activity in these areas, the United States, in conjunction with our 
friends and allies, will work to eliminate these terrorist sanctuaries and 
preclude any future access to these areas by terrorist organizations.103 
The Strategy relies heavily on the host nation to take the lead in developing a strategy to 
defeat terrorists within its borders.  Colombia's Democratic Security and Defense Policy 
has correctly identified Colombian territory as a center of gravity and therefore should be 
fully supported.  However, Colombia has a history of reversing its course against the 
FARC with each new administration.  It is important for the United States to strike while 
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the iron is hot.  Equally important, if the next Colombian president moves away from the 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the United States must be ready to pressure a 


























The events of September 11, 2001 and the resulting implications for U.S. foreign 
policy will be felt for decades to come.  U.S. citizens were shocked and horrified on that 
catastrophic day.  The Bush administration and Congress quickly responded with the 
overwhelming support of the public.  A counterattack against Al Qaeda, the perpetrators 
of the attack, was soon underway, but the Bush administration did not stop there.  A 
"global war on terror" was proclaimed, with far-reaching implications that perhaps are 
still not yet fully understood.  Currently in the spotlight are the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  Meanwhile, hidden in the shadows are other regional conflicts, including 
Colombia. 
Colombia has had its turn in the U.S. spotlight in the past, primarily through the 
"war on drugs."  U.S. concern over the import of cocaine and heroin from Colombia 
remains, although it receives much less publicity than the "war on terror."  The United 
States still contributes billions of dollars in foreign aid in an effort to restrict the flow of 
narcotics across U.S. borders.  The "war on terror" has altered how that money is being 
used, without significantly altering U.S. policy for the region.  The purpose of this thesis 
has been to determine the implications of the "war on terror" on both U.S. and Colombian 
policy and the strategy needed to defeat the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia 
(FARC). 
This thesis purposely avoided the debate over the definition of terrorism and the 
vagueness of the "global war on terror."  Those debates can be saved for another forum.  
Instead, this thesis has tried to answer questions given the current state of the facts.  That 
is, the United States is at war against terrorists, the FARC has been designated a terrorist 
organization by the United States, and the United States is allowing U.S. foreign aid to 
Colombia to be used for counterterror operations.  This raises the question of what kind 
of counterterror policy should be pursued in Colombia. 
The FARC is an insurgency that uses terrorist tactics.  Therefore, to understand 
the FARC better, this thesis began by analyzing insurgencies and their characteristics.  
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Since the end of the Cold War there has been great debate over two types of 
insurgency—grievance-based and greed-based.  The notion of grievance-based 
insurgencies was left over from the Cold War when insurgencies arose out of a sector of 
the population that had specific grievances with their respective governments.  The 
concept of greed-based insurgencies was introduced after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union when it was theorized that some insurgencies formed to profit from lootable 
resources. 
Analyzing the FARC within this dichotomy has proven to be troublesome.  There 
has been no general agreement on whether the FARC is a grievance- or greed-based 
insurgency.  In fact, the debate has dragged on with seemingly no end in sight.  This led 
to less than successful approaches to combating the FARC.  From the U.S. perspective, 
the perception of the FARC as merely an organized syndicate in the drug trade led to the 
policy approaches taken by the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and U.S. support for Plan 
Colombia. 
An analysis of the characteristics of grievance- and greed-based insurgencies 
shows that the FARC does not fit into either category.  The relationship to the illicit 
economy is the key characteristic difference between the two insurgencies that more or 
less shapes the remaining characteristics.  A grievance-based insurgency generally has a 
limited relationship with the illicit economy, relying primarily on popular support to fund 
the movement and challenge the government over specific grievances.  In other words, 
illicit economic activities are undertaken to supplement funding from the population, not 
as the reason for the creation of the organization.  On the other hand, a greed-based 
insurgency's primary reason for being is to profit from the illicit economy, usually 
through the sale of lootable resources.  A greed-based insurgency's grievances with the 
government derive from the government challenging the insurgency's access to lootable 
resources and the ability to make a profit.   
We see, then, how the two types of insurgency differ in their relationships with 
the government and population.  A grievance-based insurgency's relationship with the 
government is always hostile (though not necessarily violent) due to the grievances of the 
insurgency, whether they are political, economic, ethnic, or religious based.  In contrast, a 
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greed-based insurgency's relationship to the government becomes hostile only when the 
government challenges the insurgency's access to lootable resources.  Without such a 
challenge, a greed-based insurgency would be quite content to remain under the 
government's radar, making profits without attracting government attention. 
The relationship with the population also differs between the two insurgencies.  
Grievance-based insurgencies rely on popular support to sustain and propel the 
movement.  Therefore, they cultivate a friendly relationship with the population to 
encourage recruitment.  Greed-based insurgencies, on the other hand, do not require 
popular support because their illegal activities fund their movement.  A greed-based 
insurgency only needs to recruit enough cadres to manage its illicit profit-making 
operation.  Once the organization achieves sufficient size, the insurgency has no further 
need to cultivate a relationship with the population. 
The relationship to other armed actors also varies between the two types of 
insurgency.  The grievance-based insurgency's reliance on the population and grievances 
with the government has two implications.  In terms of other insurgencies within the 
same borders, a grievance-based insurgency may take a positive or negative position.  On 
the one hand, another insurgency pulls potential recruits away.  On the other hand, two 
grievance-based insurgencies may decide to join forces to achieve their goals, 
momentarily setting aside differences in the ultimate pursuit of overthrowing the 
government.  Due to the hostile relationship with the government, a grievance-based 
insurgency will always have a hostile (most likely violent) relationship with government 
armed actors, such as the military or police.  Contrastingly, a greed-based insurgency's 
relationship with other armed actors that challenge their access to the illicit economy, 
whether state or non-state, is always hostile.  Yet, if other armed actors do not present a 
direct challenge to the insurgency's ability to make a profit, the relationship will be fairly 
neutral. 
Lastly, there is the insurgencies' organizational structure, in terms of size, strength 
and cohesion.  A grievance-based insurgency's cohesion should be relatively tight 
assuming all who join share in the ideological convictions of the organization.  If the 
insurgency fails to properly indoctrinate its cadres, the potential for internal schisms 
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increases.  A greed-based insurgency is in a similar situation although the focus is on its 
relationship to the illicit economy.  Cohesion should remain tight, as all involved are 
interested in making a profit.  Cohesion may suffer if cadres attempt to split from the 
parent organization in order to profit on their own.  Size and strength of a grievance-
based insurgency are ultimately dependent on the relationship with the population.  The 
organization will grow depending on its recruiting abilities, and its strength will be 
derived from funding support of the population.  The size of a greed-based organization 
is regulated by the number needed to maximize profits.  Strength is derivative of the 
ability to profit with the least amount of intervention by other armed actors. 
Unfortunately, neither of these ideal type insurgencies adequately characterizes 
the FARC.  Therefore, this thesis has introduced a third type of insurgency, resource-
based, that more accurately captures the characteristics of the FARC.  The FARC grew 
out of the Colombian communist party with specific ideological grievances against the 
government.  Like a grievance-based insurgency, it relied on popular support, mostly 
among peasants, to sustain the movement.  The FARC traditionally engaged in 
kidnapping and extortion, but these tactics were directed at the state or the middle- and 
upper-classes.  The examination of the remaining characteristics of the early FARC 
demonstrated that the organization began as a grievance-based insurgency. 
The FARC's decision to participate in narcotrafficking caused an evolution in the 
organization, and an examination of its characteristics bears this out.  Originally, the 
FARC continued to cultivate a relationship with the peasant population by "protecting" 
them from drug traffickers and providing social services.  The most dramatic change 
occurred in 1997 when the FARC faced a strong challenge by the AUC and Bogotá.  In 
the face of this challenge, the FARC ultimately chose to protect its relationship with the 
illicit economy over its relationship with the population.  Statistics published by NGO's 
as well as the Colombian government show massacres and human rights violations 
committed by the FARC increased drastically after 1997. 
The willingness to forgo popular support to protect access to lootable resources 
led many to conclude that the FARC was merely another drug cartel.  But what explains 
their continued issuance of grievances and attacks against the government?  These two 
 57
characteristics are indisputably representative of grievance-based insurgencies.  The 
FARC's declaration of grievances must be taken at face-value because there is no way to 
prove that they are false.  The attacks against the government might be explained as a 
greed-based insurgency reacting to challenges by other armed actors, but this does not 
seem likely in the FARC's case.  If the FARC only cared about drug trafficking, however, 
one would expect them to act more like drug cartels whose only interactions with the 
state are to defend their interests from military/police attack or attempt to buy elected 
officials.  Also, FARC members display no ostentatious signs of wealth, a common 
characteristic of organized criminals.  Continued FARC attacks, mostly targeting 
government actors, is evidence that the FARC is more than just a greed-based 
insurgency. 
Hence, the need to introduce the term resource-based insurgency.  This term is 
used to describe insurgencies that demonstrate grievances, yet also maintain an interest in 
the illicit economy.  In the case of the FARC, this affected the insurgency's relationship 
to the population and other armed actors.  A resource-based insurgency is able to forgo 
popular support because the profits from the illicit economy allow the organization to buy 
the necessary food, supplies, and equipment.  A resource-based insurgency still needs 
recruits to create an organization large enough to sustain its struggle against the 
government, so it resorts to coercion.  Coerced recruits hamper the internal cohesion of 
the organization because they often do not share the ideological convictions of the 
insurgency. 
In addition, the relationship of a resource-based insurgency with the government 
and other armed actors differs from that of grievance- or greed-based insurgencies.  Like 
a grievance-based insurgency, a resource-based insurgency has a hostile, if not violent, 
relationship with the government.  Like a greed-based insurgency, a resource-based 
insurgency reacts hostilely to any non-state armed actors that challenge its access to 
lootable resources.  In the case of the FARC, this challenge came from the AUC. 
In sum, a resource-based insurgency adopts some characteristics from both 
grievance- and greed-based insurgencies.  The relationship to the government mimics 
grievance-based insurgencies, the relationship to the illicit economy mimics greed-based 
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insurgencies.  The relationship to other armed actors assumes the characteristics of both.  
The relationship to the population develops a new twist altogether.  The population loses 
favor in the eyes of the insurgency, yet cadres are still coerced to increase the size, thus 
possibly diminishing cohesion. 
The literature on grievance- and greed-based insurgencies identified centers of 
gravity for each type.  In the case of grievance-based insurgencies, the center of gravity is 
the population.  The population sustains the movement by providing recruits as well as 
the primary source of funding.  In previous battles with this type of insurgency, the state 
has used a "hearts and minds" (HAM) or cost/benefit approach to encourage the 
population against supporting the insurgency.  In the case of greed-based insurgencies, 
the center of gravity is the finances earned from illegal enterprises.  This has usually 
translated into economic sanctions imposed by the state and/or the strengthening of 
institutions that punish criminal behavior. 
This thesis argues that the center of gravity for resource-based insurgencies is 
territory for two reasons.  First, territory provides the insurgency access to lootable 
resources, which is the most fundamental necessity to be able to profit from the illicit 
economy.  Removing, or restricting, access to territory attacks the source of the problem, 
rather than targeting finances already earned from the sale of lootable resources.  Second, 
although a resource-based insurgency no longer relies on the population for funding, it 
still needs cadres to carry out its political objectives.  The FARC achieved this by 
coercing recruits to join the insurgency.  To counter this, the state must be able to provide 
security to those vulnerable to coercion.  The first, and most important, step to achieving 
this objective is to establish control, or a monopoly of the use of force, throughout all its 
territory.  By doing so, the state can simultaneously provide security and implement a 
HAM or cost/benefit campaign, if necessary. 
The transition of the FARC from a grievance-based to resource-based insurgency 
obviously has implications for U.S. and GOC policy, but those implications have been far 
from obvious.  This thesis has shown that U.S. and GOC views of the FARC have often 
been at odds, leading to conflicting policy approaches.  Washington considered the 
FARC primarily through the lens of the war on drugs, while Bogotá realized the greater 
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security threat the FARC presented.  The war on drugs has been largely ineffective, and 
the inability to use U.S. funds for operations against the FARC has left the Colombians 
losers on all fronts. 
The shift in U.S. policy post-9/11 may have provided the Colombians the means 
to effectively combat the FARC.  Important from both countries' perspectives is to ensure 
a clear understanding of the nature of the FARC, if any policy is going to be effective in 
the long term.  This thesis has hopefully contributed to the current literature on the 
FARC, and deepened the understanding of the threat.  Specifically, by looking at the 
different characteristics of insurgencies, this thesis introduced the FARC as a resource-
based insurgency with territory as its center of gravity.  This theory provided the 
backbone for analysis of current U.S. and GOC policy and recommendations for the 
future. 
The analysis of the case study shows that the Colombians have, indeed, developed 
a coherent, credible policy (the Democratic Security and Defense Policy and Plan 
Patriota), and that it is being implemented with some success.  What is less evident is 
whether U.S. policymakers have recognized the FARC for what it is, and have truly 
committed to helping the Colombians defeat the FARC.  Certainly, there is no indication 
of that in U.S. policy toward Colombia other than allowing monies to be used for 
"counterterror" operations.  What remains to be seen is whether the United States 
develops a more coherent counterterror policy in Colombia, or if they continue to rely on 
Colombia's policy.  If there is continued reliance on Colombian policy, Washington must 
ensure that Bogotá continues along its current path.  Deviations, perhaps after the next 
election, must be dealt with appropriately if funding is to continue.  Given Colombia's 
history of reversing strategies against the FARC, it is imperative that a long-term strategy 
is implemented in Colombia—one that will remain in place long after Bush and Uribe 
leave office. 
There are future lessons to be learned from the Colombia case, as well.  Allowing 
the host nation to develop its own strategy is an important model for the United States to 
follow in future campaigns in the "war on terror."  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan 
demonstrate the limited ability of the United States military to conduct sustained 
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operation in two localities.  This could become a recurring problem unless the 
governments that host insurgent or "terrorist" organizations take responsibility for 
COIN/counterterror operations within their borders.  This is also important because it 
prevents the United States from applying a "cookie-cutter" approach to counterterror 
operations against different organizations.  This thesis has shown that there are different 
types of insurgencies, each with a different center of gravity.  Thus, different policies and 
strategies must be utilized to defeat them.  The host nation, with hopefully the most 
intimate knowledge of the threat, should be relied on to construct and implement the 
policy.  They should also be the main providers of troops for the conflict.  The United 
States, for its part, should supply funding, equipment, and training.  Most importantly, 
U.S. policymakers must strive to gain the best possible understanding of each threat to 
ensure U.S. monies are well spent.  This seems the only logical approach to fighting a 
"global" war on terror. 
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